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This paper investigates the advantages and disadvantages of more segmented payment 
standards in earthquake insurance in Japan using a simple economic model. Using this 
analysis, we conclude that more segmented payment standards are desirable when the 
targeted consumers have higher incomes because these consumers tend to need 
insurance money at a relatively later time, whereas more segmented payment standards 
are not desirable when the targeted consumers have lower incomes because their need 
for insurance money arises relatively quickly following the earthquake. 
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I.    INTRODUCTION 
 
Earthquake insurance in Japan is committed not only by private nonlife insurers but 
also by the Japanese government following devastating earthquakes such as the 
Hanshin–Awaji Earthquake in 1995 and the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011. 
Recently, the debate about earthquake insurance promoted by the Japanese government 
has been extensive.1 
In Japan, because earthquake insurance is optional for consumers who purchase 
fire insurance, the penetration of earthquake insurance is not high (25%).2 Earthquake 
insurance in Japan is based on the Act on Earthquake Insurance established in 1966. 
Subsequent to Article 1 therein, the purpose of this law ‘is to promote the dissemination 
of earthquake insurance, … thereby helping to contribute to the stability of the lives of 
disaster victims of an earthquake, etc.’ Consequently, earthquake insurance in Japan 
should not be considered as compensating for damage to houses, but for providing 
immediate living expenses for disaster victims. In other words, although fire insurance 
is basically property insurance, earthquake insurance is expense insurance.3 
 However, given this distinction, consumers may have mistaken earthquake 
insurance for property insurance and therefore feel some confusion and dissatisfaction 
with earthquake insurance in Japan.  As shown in Figure 1, 40.9% of consumers in a  
 
Figure 1 
What aspects of earthquake insurance are you dissatisfied with? 
 
Source: Nozaki (2010). 
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survey responded that “The total insurance payment is limited, and there is the 
possibility that the amount of insurance money is not paid in full at the time of a 
large-scale earthquake”; 38.7% of respondents believed that “The amount of earthquake 
insurance has to be set between 30% and 50% of the amount of fire insurance.” These 
responses suggest that many consumers believe the insurance money is generally 
insufficient to cover the rebuilding of their houses. In other words, there is a 
considerable discrepancy between the purpose of earthquake insurance as provided by 
law and that perceived by consumers. In addition, as shown in Figure 2, more than 80% 
of respondents listed ‘Building construction/repair costs’ as the main use for their 
insurance money.4 The existence of such discrepancies between policies and 
perceptions indicates that many consumers wish to obtain additional compensation for 
actual losses through earthquake insurance in Japan. 
 Furthermore, as shown in Figure 3, it is remarkable that 24% of consumers 
responded that they “Would like more segmentation of payment standards (three 
segments are insufficient)”. For earthquake insurance in Japan, there are only three 
segments: “total loss”, “half loss”, and “partial loss” with the respective limits set at 
100%, 50%, and 5% of the insurance policy.5 From that disproportional payment about 
insurance money, it seems natural that some consumers who are evaluated as “partial 
loss” complained about that segment payment standard.6 In response, the government 
and the nonlife insurance industry are now considering to change the current 
three-segment payment standards system into a more segmented one.7 
 
Figure 2 
Use of insurance proceeds 
 
Source: Nozaki et al. (2013). 
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Figure 3 
Requests for earthquake insurance system and products 
 
Source: Nozaki et al. (2013). 
 
 
 More segmented payment standards would certainly benefit consumers by 
making it possible for them to obtain an amount of insurance money closer to the actual 
losses. However, more segmented payment standards may complicate damage 
estimation, and the process needed to determine which particular segment damage is 
included would naturally increase assessment costs.8 Similarly, we cannot ignore the 
fact that more segmented payment standards would lengthen the period of time between 
an earthquake and the payment of insurance money once a claim is made. This means a 
considerable waiting cost would be imposed on disaster victims after an earthquake. 
Given this background, the purpose of this article is to investigate the advantages 
and disadvantages of more segmented payment standards using a simple economic 
model. In other words, our study is focused mainly on claim adjustment after the 
accident. In particular, it is valuable to discuss the claim adjustment of earthquake 
insurance in Japan because the payment standards of earthquake insurance in Japan are 
regulated unlike other kinds of insurance. Even if there is no asymmetric information 
problem in the claim adjustment procedure, the claim adjustment problem in earthquake 
insurance in Japan remains.9 Thus, we are interested in how to design optimal payment 
standards, which has important policy implications for the reform of earthquake 
insurance in Japan. 
Furthermore, our study may be similar to the studies on risk classification 
because both claim adjustment and risk classification are focused mainly on examining 
problems in an insurance market.10 However, both research themes are different in the 
following two ways. First, risk classification is conducted before selling insurance 
products, while the claim adjustment is conducted after the accident. Thus, the 
individuals are the policyholders in the time of claim adjustment, while they are not the 
policyholders in the time of risk classification. Second, risk classifications are revealed 
to individuals by, for example, discounted insurance premia for low-risk individuals, 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BUSINESS, 19(4), 2014                          315 
whereas the claim adjustment procedure is not revealed to individuals. Thus, the 
problems caused by asymmetric information in each study should be distinguished. 
 
II.    THE MODEL 
 
Assume a single property-owning household that has purchased earthquake insurance 
and the situation where this property has been damaged by an earthquake. The 
household’s payoff function, , is as follows: 
 
      t x D 1 m s z t                 (1) 
 
where t = period of time between the earthquake and the receipt of the insurance money 
(hereafter, the “loss adjustment period”);  t = discount rate in period t; x = amount 
of insurance money; D = amount of damage; s = amount of savings; m = interest rate. 
For simplicity, the interest rates for lending and borrowing are equal; and  z t = 
amount of cost incurred by the delay in receiving the insurance money (hereafter, the 
“delay cost”). For example, a self-employed business-owning household purchases 
earthquake insurance for its store. When the store is damaged by an earthquake, the 
household cannot operate its business and therefore incurs a delay cost until it receives 
the insurance money 
 We can explain the household’s payoff function in Equation (1) as follows. This 
household has the right to receive insurance money if the insured property is damaged 
by the earthquake. However, the amount of insurance money paid may not be 
coincident with the amount of damage suffered if the loss adjustment period is short. To 
represent this phenomenon, we argue that the amount of insurance money involves 
some uncertainty distributed on the normal distribution function  )D,t(,DN~x 2 , 
where )D,t(2 is the variance and we assume that  2 t,D t 0   and 
 2 2 2t,D t 0    .  2 t,D t 0   indicates that the longer the loss adjustment 
period, the smaller the difference between the amount of damage incurred and the 
insurance money paid.  2 2 2t,D t 0    indicates that the decrease in the variance 
reduces when the loss adjustment period becomes long. Also, we assume that 
 2 t,D D 0   and  2 2 t,D t D 0     . The former assumption means that the 
larger the amount of damage, the larger the variance between amount of damage and 
the insurance money paid. The latter assumption means that the larger the amount of 
damage, the larger the reduction of variance when loss adjustment period extends. 
Because the household cannot receive insurance money at the same time as the 
damage, the present value of the insurance money is  t x . As a result, the household 
may have to draw on its savings until it receives the insurance money. If savings remain 
when the household eventually receives the insurance money, the household can 
receive interest income   m s z t . In contrast, if the loss adjustment period eventually 
becomes so long that all of the household’s savings are used, the household has to 
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borrow from a financial institution and pay interest expense   m z t s . 
Two other variables  t  and  z t  included in Equation (1) are characterized 
as follows. First, assume that  t t 0   and  2 2t t 0    .  t t 0   indicates 
that the discount rate falls as the loss adjustment period becomes longer. 
 2 2t t 0     shows that the fall in the discount rate becomes smaller as the loss 
adjustment period becomes longer. Second, assume that  z t t 0    
and  2 2z t t 0   .  z t t 0   indicates that the delay cost becomes larger as the 
loss adjustment period becomes longer.  2 2z t t 0   shows that the increase in the 
delay cost increases as the loss adjustment period becomes longer. 
The household is assumed to be weakly risk averse and the form of its utility 
function is specified as follows: 
 
 u exp r                              (2) 
 
where r ≥ 0 is the degree of absolute risk aversion. We can then compute the 







                 (3) 
 
where  E   and  Var   are the expectation and variance operators, respectively. 
The expectation and variance of the household’s payoff can be computed as 
 
                E E t x D 1 m s z t 1 t D 1 m s z t                  (4) 
 
             
2 2Var Var t x D 1 m s z t t t,D                   (5) 
 
Substituting equations (4) and (5) into equation (3), the certainty equivalent is 
 
            
2 2rCE 1 t D 1 m s z t t t,D
2
                  (6) 
 
Based on the above situation, we derive the optimal loss adjustment period using 
Equation (6). In the case of r 0 , that optimal loss adjustment period, which is denoted 




   
      
 22
2
t z t t t ,DCE r
D 1 m 2 t t ,D t
t t t 2 t t
   
  
      
        
     
 
=0  (7) 
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 t z tCE
D 1 m 0
t t t
  
   
  
                 (8) 
 
III.     IMPLICATIONS 
 

























                            (10) 
 
 First, Equation (8) suggests that the higher the degree of absolute risk aversion, 
the longer the optimal loss adjustment period. This is because a household whose 
degree of absolute risk aversion is high will wish to extend the loss adjustment period 
because it is likely that it wants to avoid the difference between the amount of actual 
damage and the insurance money paid. In contrast, t*=0 is realized in the case of r 0 . 
This means that a risk-neutral household will never wish to extend the loss adjustment 
period because it will be unconcerned about any difference between the amount of 
damage and the insurance money paid. In other words, from the viewpoint of a 
risk-neutral household, extending the loss adjustment period will decrease the present 
value of the insurance money and increase the delay cost. 
Second, Equation (9) indicates that the change in the optimal loss adjustment 
period is ambiguous when the amount of damage increases because there are both 
advantages and disadvantages. When the amount of damage becomes large, reduction 
in variance between the amount of actual damage and the insurance money and 
decrease in present value of the insurance money becomes large. Households with more 
costly properties do not necessarily wish to extend the loss adjustment period. 
Finally, Equation (10) shows that the higher the interest rate, the shorter the loss 
adjustment period. This is derived from the fact that the advantage in reducing the delay 
cost, which contributes to either an increase in interest income or a decrease in interest 
expense depending on the circumstances, is larger when the interest rate is higher. This 
appears to bear some relation to the real-world situation in that, as shown in Figure 4, 
high-income households are more likely to purchase earthquake insurance than 
low-income households.12 In other words, high-income households are the major group 
of policyholders in the present Japanese earthquake insurance system. From this 
viewpoint, we conclude that extending the loss adjustment period is desirable for 
318                                                    Okura, Nozaki, Iwase 
 
present policyholders because they generally borrow at relatively low interest rates. The 
reverse holds for low-income households.13 Thus, we also conclude that extending the 
loss adjustment period may not be desirable if the Japanese government wishes to 
continue to provide earthquake insurance to low-income households. In a nutshell, 
whether extending the loss adjustment period is desirable depends on what kinds of 
households are targeted in earthquake insurance in Japan. 
 
Figure 4 
Earthquake insurance purchase by household income 
 





The original purpose of earthquake insurance in Japan, as provided by the 1966 Act on 
Earthquake Insurance, is to provide stable support for earthquake disaster victims. 
Given this original purpose, we could argue that insurance money should be paid 
promptly to the victims following an earthquake. However, the primary purpose of 
earthquake insurance is to make payments more accurately linked to actual damage, 
even though policyholders may have to wait a little longer. In other words, there is a 
discrepancy between the characteristics of policyholders who are considered for the 
purpose of earthquake insurance and policyholders who have actually purchased 
earthquake insurance. It is impossible for a single insurance product to simultaneously 
satisfy both groups’ needs. This situation is also closely related to the segmentation of 
payment standards that has recently been debated in Japan. 
Against this background, this study investigated the advantages and 
disadvantages of the increased segmentation of payment standards using a simple 
economic model. Using this analysis, we concluded that more segmented payment 
standards are desirable when the targeted consumers have higher incomes because these 
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consumers tend to need insurance money at a relatively later time, whereas more 
segmented payment standards are not desirable when the targeted consumers have 
lower incomes because their need for insurance money arises relatively quickly 
following the earthquake. In other words, given the characteristics of current 
policyholders, we recommend more segmented payment standards, whereas given the 
characteristics of policyholders who coincide with the purpose of earthquake insurance, 
more segmented payment standards would not be recommended. 
We should note that there are several possible extensions to our model. For 
example, our model only considered economic aspects such as damage and delay cost. 
However, especially in the case of an earthquake, noneconomic damage such as 
psychological damage may be equally important. Furthermore, in the real world, prior 
to an insurance money payment, insurers usually visit the homes of victims to assess 
damage. We consider that the timing of this visit directly affects the degree of 





1.  For example, a project team was formed in 2012 to examine the provision of 
earthquake insurance by the Japanese government. 
2.  See World Bank (2012, p. 4). Furthermore, Naoi et al. (2010) and Waldenberger 
(2013) discussed the reasons why the penetration of earthquake insurance is not 
high. 
3.  Because there is an exception clause in fire insurance in the case of earthquakes, 
fire insurance is not property insurance. Kozuka (2012a, 2012b) discussed such an 
exception clause. 
4.  This includes building construction/repair costs (59.4%), repair/repurchase of 
furniture (excluding home appliances) (8.4%), repair/repurchase of other household 
goods (8.3%), and repair/repurchase of home appliances (excluding PCs) (5.5%). 
5.  For details, see World Bank (2012, p. 5). 
6.  For example, see The Japan Times (March 18, 2012) [Online] (accessed August 7, 
2014).http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/03/18/national/quake-insurance-is- 
but-a-token-offering/ 
7.  One typical example is the “Report on Earthquake Insurance” issued in November 
2011. This report argues for the introduction of a four-segment payment standards 
system. For details, see the following website (in Japanese) (accessed August 7, 
2014): http://www.mof.go.jp/about_mof/councils/jisinpt/report/20121130_00.html 
#3-4 
8.  For details, see Nozaki (2013). 
9.  The asymmetric information problem exists in the claim adjustment procedure. The 
individuals have considerable information about the damaged properties; see, for 
example, Crocker and Tennyson (2002) and Boyer (2004). Furthermore, 
individuals cannot know the exact amount of damage because they do not know the 
damage estimation method used by the insurers; see, for example, Lee and Okura 
(2008). 
10.  For details about risk classification studies, for example, see Thomas (2007). 
11.  The second-order condition is always satisfied because           . 
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12. Athavale and Avila (2011) investigated the relationship between income and 
penetration of earthquake insurance using the data in the New Madrid fault zone in 
Missouri and found a positive relationship between them. Naoi et al. (2012) 
derived the same results using data from Japanese panel surveys that were 
conducted after the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011. 
13.  Relative to income, low-income households suffered more from earthquake 
damage than high-income households, as indicated in, for example, Bolin and 
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